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ABSTRACT
This paper clarifies one of the puzzling results of the economic growth literature: the impact of
military expenditure is frequently found to be non-significant or negative, yet most countries spend
a large fraction of their GDP on defense and the military. We start by empirical evaluation of the
non-linear interactions between military expenditure, external threats, corruption, and other relevant
controls. While growth falls with higher levels of military spending, given the values of the other
independent variables, we show that military expenditure in the presence of threats increases growth.
We explain the presence of these non-linearities in an extended version of Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995), allowing the dependence of growth on the severity of external threats, and on the effective
military expenditure associated with these threats.
Joshua Aizenman Reuven Glick
Department of Economics Economic Research Department 
University of California, Santa Cruz Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco







This paper studies the long-run impact of military expenditure on growth. A well known 
empirical regularity is the low impact of government expenditure on growth. This result was 
obtained in Barro’s cross-country growth regression investigation, where the coefficient of 
government expenditure on growth is frequently non-significant. This finding applies also for 
military expenditures, the impact of which is frequently found to be non-significant or negative 
(see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
1  
We conjecture that these findings are due to non-linearities and omitted variable biases. 
Consequently, the ultimate growth effects of military expenditure can be traced only after 
controlling properly for the interaction between the intensity of threats and military expenditure. 
We validate this conjecture by estimating growth equations for a cross-section of countries over 
the period 1989-98, identifying the presence of non-linear interaction between threats and 
military expenditure. This is done by adding a constructed measure of military threats to the 
conventional growth regressions, allowing for non-linear interactions. Our findings validate the 
conjecture, showing that military expenditure in the presence of threats increases growth. 
We provide the theoretical underpinning for the interaction between military expenditure and 
threats by extending Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) to account for the impact of military 
expenditure on growth. We do it in a framework that recognizes the adverse impacts of hostile 
external threats and actions on growth, in the presence of rent seeking and corruption. We also 
provide empirical evidence of non-linear interaction effects of corruption when analyzing the 
impact of military spending on growth.  
We close the paper with discussion of possible extensions to the analysis of the analysis. We 
suggest avenues for further empirical examination of the relation between growth and military 
spending. We also discuss extensions to the theoretical framework, including possible linkages 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the literature on defense expenditure and growth see Ram (1995). See also 
Chowdhury (1991), Mintz and Stevenson (1995), Landau (1996), and Knight, Loayza and Villanueva 
(1996). 
 
  1between military expenditure and the economic structure through R&D spending, human capital 
accumulation, and learning by doing.  
 
2.  Threats, Military Expenditure and Growth: Empirical Evidence 
We start the investigation with the following conjecture: 
•  The impact of military expenditure on growth is a non-linear function of the effective 
militarized threat posed by foreign countries and other external forces. Threats without 
expenditure for military security reduce growth, military expenditure without threats 
would reduce growth, while military expenditure in the presence of sufficiently large 
threats increases growth. 
 
More specifically, denoting real growth by gy military expenditures by mil, and a country’s 
effective threat by thr, our conjecture may be expressed as  
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This in turn suggests a growth equation specification of  
12 1 1 1 2 () () ; 0 , 0 , gy a mil a thr mil bthr X a b a β =+ ++ <<>     
where X is a set of control variables.
2 The direct effects of military spending and external threats 
on growth are assumed negative, while the interactive effect is positive. 
As a preliminary effort to empirically support our conjecture, we provide results from 
estimating the growth equation above for a cross-section of countries over the period 1989-98. 
 
Description of Data  
We construct gy from data on real per capita GDP from the Penn World Tables, version 6.1 
(PWT6.1). Transition countries are excluded from the sample. 
mil is measured as the average of the ratio of nominal military expenditures to nominal GDP 
over the period 1989-98, using data obtained from the World Bank World Development 
                                                 
2 For simplicity,   is constrained equal to b . These coefficients would differ in circumstances where 
growth is impacted by higher moments of mil and thr. 
2 a 2
 
  2Indicators 2002 CD-ROM.
3 Since this source provides data on military spending for the years 
1989-98 only, this effectively constrained the length of the time series used in constructing our 
cross-section averages; in future work we intend to extend the series from other sources.
4  
We proxy a country’s degree of external threat by counting the number of wars and 
adversaries against whom it has been involved in conflict. Specifically, thr is defined as the 
number of years a country was at war with each of its adversaries during the period 1970 to 1998 
summed over the set of its adversaries. Thus the external threat faced by a country rises with the 
number of wars in which is has been engaged, the number of adversaries it faces in each war, as 
well as with the number of years that each war persists.
5 This variable was constructed from data 
on militarized interstate disputes collected by the Correlates of War Project (COW) at the 
University of Michigan.
6 
                                                 
3 The World Bank reports the ratio of military expenditures to GNP; we converted these figures into ratios 
relative to GDP. 
 
4 The source of the World Bank data on military spending is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA). While the ACDA has reported figures for 10-year rolling periods in its (more or less) annual 
publication World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers as far back as the 1960s, various problems 
of consistency must be addressed before they can be assembled into a single panel time series. The 
main problem concerns how the ACDA converts local currency spending data into current or real dollar 
terms for comparison across countries and time; this problem is much less severe when the spending 
data is scaled by GDP. An alternative source sometimes used by other researchers in this area is the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). However, the SIPRI data face consistency 
issues as well; moreover, its country coverage is smaller than that provided by the ACDA. For a 
comparison of problems with military spending data from various sources, see Happe and Wakeman-
Linn (1994).  
 
5 Possible permutations of this measure include weighting conflicts by their intensity or by the timing of 
their occurrence, including potential threats from neighbors or other countries that did not manifest 
themselves in actual wars over the period, and taking account of the military capabilities of actual or 
potential adversaries. Another possible extension of our analysis is taking account of the occurrence of 
civil wars and internal threats that may also influence the magnitude of military spending. We will 
pursue permutations of our threat measure that take account of these factors in future research.  
 
6 We use Zeev Maoz’s dyadic data set DYMID1.1, a revised version of the COW dataset for MID2.1 
(webpage: http://spirit.tau.ac.il/zeevmaoz). This data set codes the level of hostility reached in a given 
country's conflict with other opposing state(s), where 2 = threat of force, 3 = display of force, 4 = use of 
force (short of war), and 5 = war. We construct our threat variable with disputes of hostility level 5, 
which generally involve more than 1,000 battle deaths. The data set is extended from 1992 through 
1997 with information on “Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-1999” from the University of 
Maryland’s Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) and The Statesman’s Yearbook (webpage: 
http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/cspframe.htm).  
  3We also include a standard set of control variables typically used in the empirical growth 
literature (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Ch. 12). These controls include the initial levels of 
per capita real GDP and education, population growth, and the investment rate, among other 
variables. More specifically, our control variables include lgdp, the log of real per capita GDP in 
1975; leduc, the log of the number of years of schooling attained by males aged 25 and over at 
the secondary and higher levels in 1975; gpop, population growth over 1989-98; and inv/gdp, the 
average real investment/ GDP ratio over 1984-88. Data on GDP levels, population, and 
investment/GDP ratios are drawn from PWT6.1; the education data are taken from the from 
Barro-Lee data set (website:www2.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/barrolee).
7 
Summary statistics for mil, thr, gy, and our other control variables are shown in Table 1. 
Military spending as a share of GDP ranges from 0 to more than 40 percent (for Kuwait). Our 
threat count variable ranges from 0 to 15 (for Vietnam).
8 The unconditional correlation of mil 
and thr is 0.33, and the correlation conditioned on data availability for the variables in our 
growth equation is 0.48, implying countries with higher levels of military spending also tend to 
face greater external threats. Figure 1 gives a scatter plot illustrating the same positive relation 
between these variables (with observations indicated by three-letter country labels).
9 This finding 
supports our view of the importance of taking account of the interaction of military spending and 
the level of “need” for military services when analyzing the impact of military spending on 
economic growth.  
 
                                                 
7 The education data is available for only 99 countries and is the main constraint on the number of 
countries included in our cross-section regression analysis.  
 
8 Kuwait and Vietnam are both eliminated when the sample is conditioned on the availability of all of the 
variables entering into our growth equation specification. In the latter case, Israel is the country with the 
highest level of mil (10.5 percent of GDP) and Iran is the country with the highest value of thr (9).  
 
9 The observations are conditioned on data availability for all of the variables in the estimated growth 
equation.  
 
  4Empirical Results 
We test the relationship among our variables more formally by estimating our growth 
equation with ordinary least squares.
10 The results are shown in Table 2.  
The control variables have the expected signs and are significant at conventional levels. Per 
capita growth depends positively on the education level and investment rate and negatively on 
population growth. We also find evidence of the usual conditional convergence result: countries 
with high initial income levels grow more slowly.
11  
The three columns of Table 1 compare the effects on growth of including our measures of 
military spending and external threat.  
Column (1) in Table 1 shows the effect of including only the ratio of military spending to 
GDP. The estimated coefficient is negative, but is highly insignificant (the p level is .59). This 
result accords with that of Barro (1991a, 1991b) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) who fail to 
find any significant effect of military spending on growth.
12 As shown in column (2), adding our 
threat measure as an explanatory variable, increases the magnitude (in absolute value) of the 
coefficient on military spending, but it is still not significant at conventional levels (the p-level is 
0.11). Moreover, the coefficient on thr, though very significant, is positive, implying that 
external conflicts have a positive effect on growth, contrary to our expectation.  
However, as shown in column (3), including an interactive term involving mil and thr 
provides support for our conjecture. mil now has a very significant (at better than 1%) and 
                                                 
10 We ignore concerns about the possibly endogeneity of our explanatory variables. We also do not take 
account of the possible impact of military spending on physical or human capital investment. To the 
extent that military spending crowds out such investment, our results should understate the impact of 
military expenditures on growth.  
 
11 Our estimated conditional rate of convergence ranges from 1.6 to 1.9 percent (in absolute value) and is 
somewhat smaller than that found by others. This can be attributed to the fact that other studies 
typically measure growth over a much longer period—25 to 30 years—compared to our period length 
of only 11 years. 
 
12 Barro (1991a, 1991b) finds no effect of military spending on growth for a single cross-section of 
countries over the period 1960-85, while Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Table 12-3) find no effect 
when the sample consists of two nonoverlapping panels of ten years each for the period 1965-85. 
Martin Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva (1996) also find that the military spending ratio has an 
insignificant effect on growth in a cross-section over the 1971-85 period; however, the effect is 
significant and negative when they utilize a panel estimator applied to three non-overlapping five-year 
periods. These studies all include a separate dummy variable indicating whether a country participated 
in one or more wars over the sample period.  
  5negative direct effect on growth. The coefficient on thr is now negative, as expected (though it is 
not significant), implying a higher level of external threat directly reduces growth.  
The coefficient on the interactive term is significant (at a 5% level) and positive, as conjectured: 
the presence of threats (algebraically) raises the marginal impact of military expenditures on 
growth.  
In fact, the coefficients on mil and mil*thr imply that for threat levels below (above) 3.5 
(=0.56/0.16) greater military spending has an overall negative (positive) effect on growth. 
Quantitatively, the estimated impact of military spending ranges from a low of -0.56 for 
countries with no threats to a high of 0.88 for a country with the maximum threat level.
13 That is, 
the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the military spending/GDP ratio varies from a 
reduction in growth by almost 0.6 of a percentage point to an increase in growth by almost 0.9 
percentage points. [J: Last sentence may be redundant, but I wanted to clarify the units.] 
As a check on the results, the growth equation was reestimated by interacting mil with two 
separate dummy variables: one for countries facing low threats, i.e. with values of thr less than 
3.5 (the break point level identified above), and the other for countries with high threat levels, 
i.e. with values of thr greater than 3.5. (Separate intercepts for low and high threat countries were 
also included in place of a common constant term.) This specification results in an estimated 
coefficient for mil of  –0.47 (s.e. = 0.20) in the low threat range and of 0.26 (s.e. = 0.27) in the 
high threat range. That is, the effect of mil on growth is negative when thr is low and positive 
when thr is high.
14 These estimated coefficients are jointly significantly different from zero (p-
value= 0.04) and also significantly different from each other (p-value = 0.03) Thus this piece-
wise linear specification implies a relationship similar to that found in the specification including 
the interaction term between mil and thr. 
Figures 2 and 3 graphically illustrate the relationship among growth, military spending, and 
threats. Figure 2 shows the partial relation between growth and military spending, as implied by 
the regression from column 3 of Table 2, with the interaction effect of mil and thr included. The 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
13 Since the sample median of thr is 0, when evaluated at this value of of thr the marginal effect of 
military spending on growth is also -.56. When evaluated at the sample mean of thr (0.76), an increase 
in military spending reduces growth by (0.56 – 0.16*0.76=) 0.44 of a percentage point.  
 
14 Note that the negative direct effect of thr on growth implies that greater threat levels do not  necessarily 
lead to an overall rise in growth.     
  6horizontal axis plots military spending for the countries included in the regression sample. The 
vertical axis shows the corresponding growth rate of GDP after filtering out the effects explained 
by all explanatory variables other than mil, including the direct effect of  thr and the interactive 
term.
15 The negative slope apparent in the scatter plot is consistent with the negative relation 
reported for the regression; that is, growth falls with higher levels of military spending, given the 
values of the other independent variables (including the interaction effect).  
Figure 3 shows the partial relations between the growth rate and military spending ratio for 
the low and high ranges of the threat variable identified earlier. In the top panel, where thr is 
below 3.5, the estimated relation is negative. In the bottom panel, where thr is above 3.5, the 
estimated relation is positive.  
 
3. Theoretical  Model 
We model the interaction of growth, military spending, and external threats by extending 
Barro (1990). To simplify, we assume zero population growth. Output per worker is impacted 
positively by infrastructure supplied by the public sector, and negatively by the magnitude of the 
external threat. The reduced form of output is  
() ()
1 yA k gf
αα − =          ( 1 )  
where A is an exogenous productivity factor, k is the capital/labor ratio, g is the 
infrastructure/labor ratio, and 1 - f  measures the output cost of the threat posed by foreign rivals’ 
actual or potential hostile actions. We assume that this cost depends negatively on domestic 
military expenditures and positively on an index of the magnitude of the threat; for simplicity we 
adopt the following functional form:
16  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
15 The residual is calculated from the regression that contains all of the variables, including mil, thr, and 
mil*thr. But the contribution from military spending is left out when computing the unexplained part of 
gy plotted on the vertical axis in the scatter diagram.  Constructing residual growth in this manner 
implicitly evaluates the marginal effect of military spending by assuming each country faces no 
external threat. (The residuals are normalized to have a mean of 0.) 
 
16 This form allows a tractable solution. Our analysis applies for other functional forms, including a 
logistic specification. See Hirshleifer (1995), Skaperdas (1996), and Epstein (1997) for models of 
military conflicts illustrating the importance of considering relative military efforts among rivals in 
modeling and determining conflict outcomes.  
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where   is domestic military expenditure and   is the foreign threat level. Note that this  
specification implies that   is measured in units comparable to that of domestic military 





Corruption may also be introduced into the model as activity that taxes fiscal expenditures on 
military and non-military government spending at a rate of  . Hence, output with corruption is   c t















     ( 3 )  
We denote the ratio of military to non-military infrastructure expenditure by φ ,  
   m gg φ = .           ( 4 )  
Thus, the total fiscal outlay on both military and non-military spending is ( g ) 1 φ + .
18  
The rest of the model’s specification is identical to that of Barro (1990). The fiscal outlay is 
financed by a proportional tax τ : 
   y g τ φ = + ) 1 ( .           ( 5 )  
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Following the methodology described in Barro (1990), it follows that the output growth rate is 















.         ( 7 )  
The optimal pattern of taxes and spending (denoted by  , τ φ % % ) that determine the size of the 
military sector and maximize the growth rate is given by
19  
                                                 
17 This suggests that the external threat level may be proxied by the level of foreign military expenditures, 
rather than the incidences of conflict between the domestic country and its foreign rivals, as in our 
empirical analysis in Section 2.   
 
18 Note that the share of military spending out of total government expenditures is 
/( ) /(1 )
mm gg gφ φ += +; the military spending-to-output ratio is  // ( 1
m gy ) φτφ = + . Also note that, 
though /( )
mm g gg +  and  /
m g y are bounded by 1, φ  is not.  
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Equation (8a) equates the tax rate ( ( )/ m gg y τ = + , and thereby also the government’s 
expenditure share) to the output elasticity with respect to the marginal product of nonmilitary 
spending, α , magnified at the rate φ  ( the ratio of military to non-military government 
expenditure).
20 In the absence of military spending, (8a) reduces to τ α = , the standard 
production efficiency condition, as derived by Barro (1990).  From equation (8b) we can infer 
that the military expenditure ratio, φ, depends positively on the external threat (normalized by the 
domestic stock of capital), positively on the corruption level, and negatively on the productivity 
level: 
%%% (, , ) ; 0 , 0 , 0 ; ( 0 , , ) 0 .
c cc ztA zt A t A φφ φ φ φ φ => > < %% % =      (9) 
 
Correspondingly, from (8a) it follows 
 
. 0 ~ ; 0 ~ ; 0 ~ ); , , ( ~ ~ < > > = A t z c c A t z τ τ τ τ τ  
Figure 4 plots the relation between military spending and the threat level implied by (8b) and 
(9).
21 In the absence of threats,  , then  0 z = % 0 φ = , i.e. the optimal amount of military spending is 
zero. For positive threat levels,  , however,  , i.e. the optimal level of military spending 
is positive. As the threat level increases, the optimal amount of military spending increases 
monotonically. Figure 4 also illustrates the effect of parametrically increasing the corruption rate, 
. The solid line depicts the benchmark relation between 
0 z > % φ 0 >
c t φ  and z (for .1 c t = ); the dashed line 
                                                                                                                                                             
, max [ ] φτ
19 See the mathematical appendix for the derivation. These results were obtained by solving 
simultaneously the first-order conditions associated with the problem of  γ . This maximization 
is subject to the constraints imposed by (3)-(5), applying the implicit function theorem. We assume that 
the magnitude of the productivity coefficient and the rate of time preference meet the conditions leading 
to positive endogenous growth. See Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for further details. 
 
20 With optimally set tax and expenditure rates, it is straightforward to show that  / gy α = and  /
m gyαφ = % . 
 
21 Figure 3 is calibrated by assuming  1 A = ,  .2 α = , and t  set equal to .1 or .2  c
 
  9depicts the effect of increasing the corruption rate (to t .2 c = ). Evidently, higher corruption 
implies a higher optimal level of military spending for any given threat level.  
z
A useful characterization of equilibrium government spending is that the optimal share of 
military expenditure is proportional to the output cost of external threats, 1 f −  (see the appendix 
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In the absence of threats, the optimal level of military spending is zero, the output cost of 
threats is zero (f = 1), and output is a standard CRS function of k and g (see equation (1)). 
Correspondingly, the optimal tax rate (τ % ) equals the output share of government services (α ), 
and is independent of scale effects (as follows from (8a) and (10)).  The presence of threats and 
hostile actions, however, implies positive military spending and output costs (f < 1), and adds a 
non-linear multiplicative term (f ) to output.   
This in turn adds a scale consideration to the design of optimal tax and spending rates, 
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gm .  The optimal ratio of military to non-military government spending (% φ ) times 
the output share of nonmilitary spending (α ) equals the output cost of external threats (1 f − ), 
which in turn equals the magnitude of the foreign threat ( ) relative to the aggregate effective 
military expenditure by the domestic country and its foreign rival ( z t g c m + − ) 1 ( ~ ), where 
“effective” implies net of corruption tax.  Consequently, an exogenous increase in the foreign 
threat level,  , increases the optimal spending and tax rates,  z % φ  and τ % .   
Hence, the foreign hostility level impacts growth adversely due to two compounding effects: 
the direct adverse growth effect associated with the resultant drop of the marginal product of 
capital (see equation (7)), magnified by the adverse effects associated with the higher tax rate 
induced by lower productivity.  Applying the same logic, it follows that higher corruption ( ) 
and lower domestic productivity (A) increase military spending and the optimal tax rate and 
c t
  10reduce growth. Accordingly, we can derive the following reduced-form expression for optimal 
output growth: 
(, , ) ; 0 , 0 , 0 .
c cztA zt A γ γγ γ γ =< < %% % % % >  
















thus confirming the nonlinear theoretical relationship between growth and military spending that 
we conjectured and tested empirically in Section 2.   
We illustrate these results in Figure 5, which plots the corresponding relation between the 
optimal levels of growth and military spending, while holding constant the levels of external 
threat and corruption. 
22 Higher military spending reduces growth, ceteris paribus. A higher 
threat level shifts the entire locus upward.  
 
4. Military  Expenditure,  Corruption, and Growth: Empirical Evidence 
Our theoretical model suggests that the relation between military expenditure and growth 
also depends on corruption and rent seeking behavior. In particular, by acting as a tax on fiscal 
expenditures, corruption raises the desired level of military spending. Accordingly, we 
conjecture:  
 
•  The impact of military expenditure on growth is a non-linear function of the level of 
corruption. Military expenditure in the presence of corruption reduces growth. 
 
In this section we present some empirical evidence concerning the association between 
military spending, corruption, and growth.
23 We initially abstract from the role of external threats 
considered in the empirical analysis of Section 2. 
                                                 
22 Figure 5 is calibrated by assuming  .2 α = , t .1, 1, .02 c σ ρ = == ,  / .0001 zk = (for the solid 
line), (for the dashed line), and parametrically varying A to determine  / .001 zk = % φ  and % γ . See the  
appendix. 
 
23 See Gupta, de Mello and Sharan (2000) for evidence that corruption raises military spending with a 
panel data set covering the period 1985-98.  
 
  11As our measure of corruption, we employ the index constructed by Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1997) based on data from Business International (BI) and the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). The Tanzi-Davoodi measure, ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt), and 
hence may be interpreted as an increasing index of “good government” practices.
24 The 
explanatory variable goodgov is defined as the average level of this index  over the period 1989-
95.
25 The unconditional correlation of mil and goodgov is –0.18, implying that the military 
spending share of GDP tends to fall with good government and rise with corruption.
26 However, 
when the sample is restricted only to countries with data available for all of the variables in our 
growth equation, the correlation is only -.02.
27 Figure 6 plots the good government index against 
the ratio of military spending to GDP for this restricted sample. No clear relationship is apparent 
in the scatter.  
Table 3 reports the effects of including corruption in our model of growth, along with the 
same control variables used in Table 2; a dummy for sub-Saharan African countries has also 
been added.  
As column (1) of Table 3 indicates, the coefficient on our good government variable is 
positive and significant, implying better government and less corruption has a positive effect on 
growth.
28 An improvement in the good government index by one unit (on a scale of  0 to 10) is 
                                                 
24 The BI index ranges from 0 to 10, while the ICRG index ranges from 1 to 6. Tanzi and Davoodi splice 
the two series together to form a single 0-10 index for 1980 to 1995.  The Tanzi-Davoodi  measure 
refers specifically to the extent of bribes and other illegal payments demanded by government officials 
in business dealings and other transactions.  The ICRG also collects data on a number of other measures 
of institutional quality, including maintenance of the rule of law, quality of the bureaucracy, risk of 
expropriation, and risk of repudiation of government contracts.  
 
25 Our results below are unaffected if we define goodgov as the level of corruption for 1989, the initial 
year of our sample.  
 
26 A linear regression of mil on goodgov gives a coefficient of .47, with t-statistic of 1.99. 
 
27 The observations are conditioned on data availability for all of the variables in the estimated growth 
equation reported in Table 3 below.  
 
28 This marginal effect is calculated conditional on a country having the highest level of corruption, i.e. 
goodgov = 0. When evaluated at the sample median of goodgov (5.36), an increase in military spending 
reduces growth by only (-1.27+ 0.20*5.36 =) -0.20 of a percentage point.  When evaluated at the 
sample mean of goodgov (6.00), an increase in military spending reduces growth by (-1.27+ 0.20*6.0 
=) -0.07.   
 
  12estimated to raise the growth rate by 0.50 percentage point.
29  This finding accords with that of 
Mauro (1995), among others.
30 Column (2) indicates that the significance of corruption is robust 
to adding the ratio of military spending to GDP, but the latter is highly insignificant (the p level 
is 0.85). However, as shown in column (3), including an interactive term involving mil and 
goodgov provides support for a nonlinear relation between military spending, corruption, and 
growth. mil now has a very significant (at better than 1%) and negative direct effect on growth. 
The direct effect of goodgov on growth is now insignificant, but the coefficient on the interactive 
term is significant (at a 1% level) and positive, implying military expenditure in the presence of 
better government raises growth.
31 This result is consistent with our model. 
In fact, the coefficients on mil and mil*goodgov  imply that for threat levels above 6.35 
(=1.27/0.20) greater military spending has an overall positive effect on growth. Analogously to 
our analysis of the role of external threats, the growth equation was reestimated by interacting 
goodgov with separate dummy variables for countries with low and high levels of goodgov, i.e. 
with values of goodgov less than and greater than the cutoff value of 6.35, respectively. (Separate 
intercepts were also included in place of a common constant term.) This specification results in 
an estimated coefficient for goodgov of  –0.35 (s.e. = 0.17) in the low range and of 0.26 
(s.e.=0.19) in the high range. That is, the effect of mil on growth is negative when goodgov is 
low and positive when it’s high. These estimated coefficients are jointly significantly different 
from zero (p-value= 0.03) and also significantly different from each other (p-value = 0.01) Thus 
this piece-wise linear specification implies a relationship similar to that found in the specification 
including the interaction term between mil and thr. 
Figure 7 plots the partial relation between growth and military spending, as implied by the 
regression from column (3) of Table 3. The vertical axis shows the growth rate of GDP after 
filtering out the effects explained by all explanatory variables other than mil (including the direct 
                                                 
29 Since the standard deviation of the goodgov variable is 2.31, a one standard deviation improvement 
would imply growth falls by .22 of a percentage point. 
 
30 Tanzi and Davoodi (1997, 2000) find indirect evidence that corruption decreases growth by reducing 
government revenue and the productivity of public investment. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), find 
that the ICRG’s  “rule of law” measure of institutional quality has a positive effect on growth. 
 
31 The coefficients on mil and mil*goodgov imply that for index levels of good government above 6.35 
(=1.27/.20), (on a scale of 0-10), greater military spending has a positive effect on growth. 
 
  13effect of goodgov and the interactive term). The negative slope apparent in the scatter plot is 
consistent with the negative relation reported for the regression; that is, growth falls with higher 
levels of military spending, given the values of the other independent variables, including 
corruption. 
These results highlight the need to control for nonlinear interaction effects of corruption  
when analyzing the effect of military spending on growth.  
We conclude this section by simultaneously considering the empirical effects of external 
threats and corruption on military spending and growth. We do so by dividing our sample into 
two subsamples according to the mean level of corruption, 6.00. Table 4 reports the results of 
estimating the nonlinear effects of military spending and threats on growth for each of these two 
samples. As shown in Column (1), the coefficient on mil and mil*thr  have the expected negative 
and positive signs, respectively, for “high” corruption countries, i.e. the countries with low 
indices of good government (goodgov < 6.0). For this subsample, the estimated coefficient for 
mil is   –0.81 and significant at 1%; the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.22 and significant 
at better than 5%.
 32  In contrast, for the “low” corruption countries (i.e. goodgov > 6.0), the 
coefficients on mil and the interaction term are insignificant (and the coefficient on mil is 
actually positive in sign). Thus the effects of mil on growth in our sample appear to hold 
primarily for countries with greater corruption.  
 
5.  Discussion and Future Research 
Our theoretical model suggests that military expenditure induced by external threats should 
increase growth (using the proper controls), while military expenditure induced by rent seeking 
and corruption should reduce growth. We have confirmed the basic conjectures implied by the 
theoretical model regarding the nonlinear relation between military spending, corruption, and 
growth in a cross-country regression growth analysis.  
Our analysis suggests a number of paths of future research concerning the relation of 
economic growth and military activity. One avenue is to investigate further the robustness and 
stability of our empirical results.  Possible steps include:  
                                                 
32 The results are not effected if a dummy variable for sub-Saharan African countries is included.  
 
  14•  Analyze the sensitivity of the results to different measures of the external security threat 
by weighting conflicts by their intensity and/or timing in relation to current spending, 
taking account of military expenditure levels and capabilities of adversaries, and 
controlling for geography-related vulnerability factors, e.g. existence of common borders 
with adversaries, distance from adversaries, land border length, coastline length, etc.  
•  Consider the impact of other economic control variables, such as government spending 
on nonmilitary activities.
33 
•  Consider the effect of political factors, such as the degree of political stability, the 
political orientation of the government, the political power of the military in society, and 
military aid from abroad. 
•  Take account of the occurrence of civil wars and internal threats that may influence 
military spending and growth. 
•  Expand the time series dimension of the dataset. This would permit comparison of the 
time-series and cross-section association of military spending and growth using various 
panel estimators, investigation of the extent to which the end of the Cold War has 
influenced military spending over time (thought the “peace dividend” effect), and 
analysis of the contemporaneous and lagged effects of conflict and spending on growth. 
•  Investigate possible channels through which military spending may (possibly 
endogenously) encourage corruption. For example, do imports from foreign arms 
suppliers foster bribery in order to secure military contracts? Where the military sector 
engages in commercial business operations or controls natural resources and competition 
is limited, are opportunities for corruption enhanced?  
Another avenue of future research is to model and test the possibility that military 
expenditures generate growth externalities.  Possible channels leading to potential positive 
externalities include R&D and human capital accumulation. Negative externalities may arise 
from corruption and costly monitoring, or from wage effects on the nontraded goods sectors 
along the line of the “Dutch Disease.” 
34  
                                                 
33 See Hewitt (1992) and Davoodi, Clements, Schiff, and Debaere (2001) for analyses of the association 
of military spending and nonmilitary government spending. 
 
34 See van Wijnbergen (1984) for a model of the “Dutch Disease.”  
  15Modeling these externalities can be done by going beyond the reduced-form “AK” type of 
growth model elaborated in equations (1)-(7). One approach is to apply a Lucas (1993) variant of 
a two-sector growth model, with one sector producing final output and the other sector producing 
human capital, which in turn is used as an input in final output production. Final output growth 
would then be dependent on human capital, the accumulation of which depends on education 
costs and learning-by-doing effects. In this model, low-income countries may underinvest in 
human capital because of capital market imperfections, such as prohibitively high education 
costs and a low initial endowment of human capital. In such countries, the wish to promote a 
“competitive” military capability may induce the government to engage in activities that 
effectively subsidize the formation of human capital, addressing indirectly the distortions 
induced by the capital market imperfections. If these effects were powerful enough (and if the 
military expenditure does not lead to countervailing adverse effects due to corruption and rent 
seeking), the net outcome would be growth enhancing.  
One expects these effects to be weak in the poorest countries, as a threshold of resources and 
human capital may be necessary to allow formation of an effective education system. These 
effects would tend to be weak in rich countries as well, where high enough income per capita 
would allow the private sector to self-finance education. Consequently, it may be conjectured 
that it is primarily in middle income countries that military expenditures may deliver strong 
growth effects due to externalities operating via the education system. 
These theoretical extensions suggest questions for further empirical research: 
•  Do positive growth externalities from military activities exist in countries where the 
human capital/worker ratio (or alternatively, the physical capital/labor ratio) in the 
military sector exceeds that in the overall economy?  
•  Are the externalities of military spending stronger in middle-income countries than in low 
or high-income countries, as the suggested extension to our model implies?  
•  What other factors determine the size of these externalities? e.g. Do they depend on the 
degree of market-orientation of the economy? Do international arms exports generate 
growth externalities? Does the composition of military spending, i.e. spending on military 
personnel vs. capital equipment (e.g. airplanes, tanks, etc.) matter? 
  16Mathematical Appendix 
 
The purpose of this Appendix is to derive equations (8a) and (8b) and characterize the 
properties of the determinants of the optimal tax, spending, and growth rates.  Note first that 
equations (3)-(5) define output as an implicit function of the tax rate ,τ , and military spending 
ratio, φ : 
   ) , ( φ τ y y = .             ( A 1 )  
From (1) and (7) it follows that the optimization problem may be expressed as  
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from which we infer that, for the optimal tax rate,  
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Combining (A5) and (A7) we find that  
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~
1 ( ~ φ α τ + = .           ( 8 a )  
To obtain a reduced-form solution for φ , we next substitute out for g in (3) with (4) and (5) as 
well as out for f with (A5), and derive  
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To establish the properties of the determinants of optimal tax and growth rates, we 
logarithmically differentiate (8b) and use (8a) to obtain   
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Equations (11) and (8a) then imply that  
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  19Data Appendix: Countries in Regression Samples 
 







Barbados BRB  * 
Belgium BEL 










Congo, Dem. Rep.  ZAR 
Congo, Rep.  COG 
Costa Rica  CRI 
Cyprus CYP 
Denmark DNK 
Dominican Republic  DOM 
Ecuador ECU 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  EGY 
El Salvador  SLV 
Fiji FJI  * 
Finland FIN 
France FRA 




















Korea, Rep.  KOR 




Mauritius MUS  * 
Mexico MEX 
Mozambique MOZ 
Nepal NPL  * 
Netherlands NLD 
New Zealand  NSZ 




Panama PAN  * 





Rwanda RWA  * 
Senegal SEN 
Sierra Leone  SLE 
Singapore SGP 
South Africa  ZAF 
Spain ESP 
Sri Lanka  LKA 
Sweden SWE 
Switzerland CHE 
Syrian Arab Republic  SYR 
Thailand THA 
Togo TGO 




United Kingdom  GBR 
United States  USA 
Uruguay URY 
Venezuela, RB  VEN 
Zambia ZMB 
Zimbabwe ZWE 
Note: Countries includes in regressions in Table 2. Countries with missing data on goodgov and that are 
omitted from the results reported in Table 3 are denoted in the last column.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
  Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max  # of cos. 
mil  3.80 5.31 0.00  40.42  133 
thr  0.90 2.36 0.00  15.00  133 
gy  1.34 2.65  -9.09 9.56  117 
lgdp  8.09 1.02 6.36 9.92  110 
gpop  1.92 0.96  -0.03 4.37  116 
leduc  1.03 0.91  -1.97 2.40  99 
inv/gdp  14.38 7.79 2.49  44.06  111 
 
Note: gy is the annual average real per capita GDP growth, 1989-98; mil is the military 
spending/GDP ratio; thr measures a country's external military threat; lgdp is the log of 
initial real per capita GDP; leduc is log of initial years of male schooling; gpop is 
population growth rate; and inv/gdp is the investment/GDP ratio. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Growth, 
Military Spending and External Threats 
 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
     
mil  -0.08    -0.26    -0.56 *** 
  (0.15)   (0.16)   (0.20)   
thr     0.39 **  -0.20  
     (0.15)   (0.28)   
mil*thr        0.16 ** 
        (0.06)   
lgdp  -1.59 ***  -1.55 ***  -1.90  *** 
  (0.44)   (0.43)   (0.44)   
leduc   0.74 *  0.69 *  0.70  * 
  (0.43)   (0.41)   (0.40)   
gpop   -1.04 ***  -1.04 ***  -1.28  *** 
  (0.40)   (0.38)   (0.39)   
inv/gdp  0.13 ***  0.12 ***  0.14  *** 
  (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04)   
constant  13.71 ***  13.84 ***  17.55  *** 
  (3.62)   (3.50)   (3.72)   
            
# of cos.  91    91    91   
Adj R2   0.24    0.29    0.33   
 
Notes: Estimation by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Dependent variable is gy, the annual 
average real per capita GDP growth over 1989-98. Explanatory variables include 
mil, military spending/GDP; thr, a measure of a country's external military threat; 
mil*thr, an interaction of the two variables; lgdp, log of initial real per capita GDP; 
leduc, log of initial years of male schooling; gpop, population growth rate; and 
inv/gdp, the investment/GDP ratio. 
   25
Table 3. Determinants of Growth, 
 Military Spending and Corruption 
 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
mil    -0.03    -1.27 *** 
    (0.14)    (0.31)   
goodgov  0.51  ***  0.50 **  -0.04  
  (0.17)    (0.17)    (0.20)   
mil*goodgov          0.20 *** 
          (0.05)   
lgdp  -2.54  ***  -2.48 ***  -2.51 *** 
  (0.46)    (0.47)    (0.42)   
leduc   0.20    0.17    0.18   
  (0.45)    (0.46)    (0.41)   
gpop   -0.88  ***  -0.81 **  -0.91 *** 
  (0.32)    (0.37)    (0.33)   
inv/gdp  0.04    0.05    0.07 * 
  (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.04)   
africa  -3.81  ***  -3.79 ***  -3.35 *** 
  (0.76)   (0.77)   (0.70)  
constant  21.02  ***  20.46 ***  23.84 *** 
  (3.48)    (3.56)    (3.29)   
# of cos.     83       81      81 
Adj R2   0.44  0.42  0.53   
 
Notes: Estimation by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Dependent variable is gy, the 
annual average real per capita GDP growth over 1989-98. Explanatory 
variables include mil, military spending/GDP; goodgov, a measure of 
corruption (higher values denote less corruption and better government); 
mil*goodgov, an interaction of the two variables; lgdp, log of initial real 
per capita GDP; leduc, log of initial years of male schooling; gpop, 
population growth rate; inv/gdp, the investment/GDP ratio; and Africa, 
dummy for sub-Saharan African countries.   26
Table 4. Determinants of Growth,  






(1)   
High 
Goodgov
(2)   
    
mil  -0.81 ***  0.19   
  (0.30) (0.22)   
thr  -0.31 -0.06   
  (0.43) (0.26)   
mil*thr  0.22  **  0.00   
  (0.10)    (0.06)   
lgdp  -1.89  ***  -2.40  *** 
  (0.64)    (0.53)   
leduc   0.87    1.13   
  (0.60)    (0.71)   
gpop   -1.99  ***  -0.42   
  (0.59)    (0.37)   
Inv/gdp  0.06    0.10  *** 
  (0.09)    (0.04)   
constant  20.27  ***  19.95  *** 
  (5.43) (4.40) 
 
# of cos.  49    32   
Adj R2   0.36 0.52 
 
Notes: Estimation by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Dependent variable is gy, annual 
average real per capita GDP growth over 1989-98. Explanatory variables 
include mil, military spending/GDP; thr, external threat; mil*thr , 
interaction variable; lgdp, log of initial real per capita GDP; leduc, log of 
initial years of male schooling; gpop, population growth rate; and inv/gdp, 
investment/GDP ratio. Subsamples defined by goodgov level, a measure 
of corruption (higher values denote less corruption and better 
government) relative to sample mean: low goodgov (goodgov < 6.0) and 













































Note: mil is military spending/GDP; thr measures a country's external military threat. 
Observations plotted for the 81 countries with data available for all variables in the 
regressions in Table 2.  
 
 
  27Figure 2. Conditional Correlation between Growth and Military Spending,  

































































































Note:  Conditional correlation calculated from regression for gy that contains all of the 
explanatory variables in Table 2, column (3), including mil, thr, and mil*thr.  The variable 
plotted on the vertical axis is the unexplained part of gy after filtering out the effects of all 
of the explanatory variables except mil. 
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Note:  Conditional correlation calculated from a regression for gy that contains all of the 
growth variable controls in Table 2 as well as mil*lowthr and mil*highthr, where lowthr  is 
a dummy defined equal to 1 for countries with a level of thr < 3.5.and highthr  is a dummy 
defined equal to 1 for countries with level of thr >3.5. (The dummies are also included as 
separate intercepts in the regression.) Panel a plots on the vertical axis the unexplained 
part of gy after filtering out the contribution of all variables except mil*lowthr; panel b  
filters out the effects of all variables except mil*highthr . 




Note: φ  is the optimal ratio of military spending to non-military spending; z/k denotes the external 
threat level (normalized by the capital stock). The plots are calibrated by assuming A=1,  .2 α = , 
and tc  set equal to .1 (solid line) or .2 (dashed line).  
  30Figure 5. Optimal Growth and Military Spending  
 
Note: γ is the optimal growth rate; φ  is the optimal ratio of military spending to non-
military spending. Plots are calibrated by assuming  .2 α = ,  .1, 1, .02 c t σ ρ = == , 
(solid line), / .0001 zk = / 001 zk . = (dashed line), and parametrically varying  
A  to determine % φ  through equations (8a) and (A10) in the appendix.  
 

























































































Note: mil is military spending/GDP; goodgov measures a country's level of good 
government. Observations plotted for the 81 countries with data available for all variables 
in the regression results reported in column (3) of Table 3.  
 
  32 Figure 7. Conditional Correlation between Growth and Military Spending,  



























Note: Conditional correlation calculated from regression for gy that contains all of the 
explanatory variables in Table 3, column (3), including mil, goodgov, and mil*goodgov. 
The variable plotted on the vertical axis is the unexplained part of gy after filtering out the 
effects of all of the explanatory variables except thr. 
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